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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND 
THEIR EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT 
MILITARY PROSECUTIONS 
 
Michael J. Davidson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The conduct of the American armed forces is frequently the 
object of congressional investigations and hearings. Indeed, 
Congress’s first investigation, conducted in 1792, inquired into the 
military defeat of Major General Arthur St. Clair’s expedition 
against Indian tribes of the Northwest Territories.1 More recently, 
senior military officers have testified about the mistreatment of 
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.2 Judge Advocates3 have 
                                                          
 * B.S., 1982, United States Military Academy; J.D., 1988, College of 
William & Mary; LL.M. (Military Law), 1994, The Judge Advocate General’s 
School; LL.M. (Government Procurement Law), 1998, George Washington 
University Law School. The author is a retired Army officer, candidate for the 
Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) degree at George Washington University 
School of Law, and an attorney with the federal government. This article was 
written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. The 
opinions contained herein are those of the author and do not represent the 
position of any federal agency. 
1 Richard J. Leon, Congressional Investigations: Are Partisan Politics 
Undermining Our Vital Institutions?, 31 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 825, 826 (1998). 
Largely untrained, St. Clair’s troops “blundered into an Indian attack,” causing 
much of the force to flee and abandon their wounded “to the scalping knife.” 
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 91-92 (1967). St. 
Clair’s expedition suffered 632 soldiers killed in action. Id. at 92. 
2 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. On Armed 
Services, Statement by Chairman Hunter, Hearings on Abu Ghraib: The 
Schlesinger Report; and the Kern, Fay, and Jones Report (Sept. 9, 2004) (“We 
also heard from three general officers, General Paul Kern, Lieutenant General 
Anthony Jones, and Major General George Fay, who lent their experience to yet 
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attempted to obtain testimony given before congressional 
committees for use at a court-martial, a practice that dates back to 
at least 1879.4 
Congressional investigations and hearings provide an effective 
means for Senators and Representatives to gather information 
necessary to perform their legislative duties. Further, public 
hearings provide Congress with the opportunity to inform the 
public about matters of national interest. Unfortunately, 
congressional investigations and hearings can interfere with the 
criminal justice system, especially when Congress grants a witness 
use immunity and that witness’s testimony is either televised or 
widely reported by the media. This power can be exploited by 
participating Members of Congress who do not have such laudable 
motives.5 
                                                          
another exhaustive examination of what went wrong with military detainee 
operations in Iraq.”). See also Josh White & Bradley Graham, Senators Question 
Absence of Blame in Abuse Report, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A17 
(reporting on testimony of Vice Admiral Church III before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee); Rowan Scarborough, Abizaid Blames ‘Broken’ System To 
Report Abuse, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A20 (reporting on hearings 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee); Stephen Dinian, Abuse In Iraq 
Not Military Policy, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at A01 (reporting that Army 
Major General Antonio Taguba and Air Force Lieutenant General Lance Smith 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee). 
3 A “judge advocate” is defined by statute as “(A) an officer of the Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps of the Army or the Navy; (B) an officer of the Air 
Force or the Marine Corps who is designated as a judge advocate; or (C) an 
officer of the Coast Guard who is designated as a law specialist.” 10 U.S.C. § 
801(13) (2000). 
4 United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1187 n.22 (A.C.M.R. 1973), 
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973) (“One of the earliest 
attempts to secure testimony given to a congressional committee was made by 
the judge advocate of a court-martial in 1879.”). A court-martial is a “military 
court, convened . . . for trying and punishing offenses in violation of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice committed by persons subject to the Code, 
particularly members of the armed forces.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (6th 
ed. 1979). 
5 See Leon, supra note 1, at 827-28 (asserting generally that a 
congressional investigation “is a delicate balancing act between a search for 
truth and the exercise of political power for policy and partisan advantage” and 
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The impact of congressional investigations and hearings can be 
disastrous for subsequent or parallel criminal prosecutions, 
including those conducted by the military. The post-My Lai court-
martial of Staff Sergeant David Mitchell6 serves as one historical 
case in point. Congressional grants of immunity can also make it 
extremely difficult to bring a subsequent criminal case against an 
immunized witness, as exemplified by the failed federal 
prosecutions of Vice Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North following the Iran-Contra scandal.7 These 
situations demonstrate that in future cases, congressional 
investigations and hearings may interfere with the normal progress 
of the military justice system and may ultimately result in the 
guilty going unpunished and justice being left undone. 
This article provides a general overview of Congress’s 
investigative powers and the limits on those powers, including the 
rights afforded to witnesses who are called to participate in a 
congressional investigation or hearing. Focusing on the military, 
and using the My Lai massacre and the Iran-Contra scandal as 
historical examples, this article discusses the impact of a 
                                                          
noting specifically that when the Republicans took control of the Senate and 
House in 1995, many Republicans wanted “payback” for the excesses of 
previously Democratic controlled congressional investigations). See also 
GENERAL (RET.) TOMMY FRANKS, AMERICAN SOLDIER 224 (2004) (“But as I 
knew from my days as ARCENT commander and my brief tenure as 
CENTCOM CINC, public congressional hearings had more to do with politics 
than with exposing facts.”); MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL 
BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 173-74 (1974) (noting how Congressman 
Gene Cox, on the eve of WWII, wanted to establish a committee to investigate 
national defense programs in order to “embarrass [President] Roosevelt” and 
explaining how the Committee on the Conduct of the War, during the Civil War, 
“wanted to cause trouble for Lincoln, which they succeeded in doing”). 
6 Sergeant Mitchell’s court-martial was one of several pursued by the Army 
following the 1968 massacre of the Vietnamese inhabitants of the hamlet of My 
Lai, Republic of South Vietnam. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
7 The Iran-Contra scandal refers to the illegal diversion of money, from the 
sale of anti-tank missiles to Iran as part of an effort to release American hostages 
held in Lebanon, to support the Nicaraguan Contra movement. Four individuals 
associated with the military were prosecuted as a result of their involvement in 
this diversion of funds. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. 
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congressional investigation on the government’s current ability to 
prosecute members of the armed forces. 
Part I provides an overview of Congress’s broad power to 
conduct investigations and hearings, and the tools it may use to 
secure testimony and evidence. This section also discusses the 
limits of Congress’s investigative powers, including the rights of 
witnesses appearing before Congress. Part II addresses a 
prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under the Jencks Act, as 
mandated by federal case law, and as required by military law. 
Further, this portion of the article discusses the relationship 
between these disclosure obligations and evidence acquired by 
Congressional investigations. Part III discusses Congress’s 
authority to grant immunity during an investigation and the effect 
of such grant on ongoing and future criminal prosecutions. Part IV 
examines the current status of common law privileges after a 
compelled waiver during a congressional investigation. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CONDUCT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INVESTIGATIONS AND HEARINGS 
In order to fully appreciate the potential impact of a 
congressional investigation or hearing on the military justice 
system, an overview of Congress’s investigative powers and 
limitations is necessary. 
A. Inherent Authority and General Limitations 
Congress’s power to investigate is not enumerated in the 
Constitution. Rather, the Supreme Court has found that power to 
be “inherent in the legislative process.”8 That such power exists is 
                                                          
8 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See also Leon, supra 
note 1, at 826-27 (“[T]he power of Congress to investigate is not a power that 
was written into the Constitution by our founding fathers. It is a power that the 
Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized for over 100 years as a power 
inherent to the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress.”). In Watkins, 
the Court reversed a contempt of Congress conviction of a witness who had 
refused to answer questions posed by the Subcommittee of Un-American 
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based on the rationale that a “legislative body cannot legislate 
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the 
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”9 
The Supreme Court has broadly defined this power to include 
“inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as 
proposed or possibly needed statutes[,] . . . and surveys of defects 
in our social, economical or political system for the purpose of 
enabling the Congress to remedy them.”10 Additionally, this power 
to investigate “comprehends probes into departments of the 
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”11 
As long as the subject matter of the investigation falls within the 
broad ambit of Congress’s investigative authority, the courts will 
not examine the actual motives of investigating committee 
members.12 
As a function of its investigative authority, Congress, or a 
committee acting on its behalf, “may depose witnesses, issue 
subpoenas, and hold hearings.”13 When called upon to review the 
                                                          
Activities Committee, determining that upon the defendant witness’s objection 
to the pertinency of the questions, the committee chairman failed to provide a 
meaningful explanation. 354 U.S. at 214-15. The failure to explain the 
pertinency of the committee’s questions did not provide defendant with “a fair 
opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer 
and his conviction [was] necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 215. 
9 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, Inc., 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) 
(quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)). 
10 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 200. See also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508 (“Our cases make clear 
that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to the 
motives alleged to have prompted it.”); United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325, 
334 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (“[N]o court can proscribe Congressional inquiries merely 
because they are alleged to involve . . . improper impelling motives . . . .”); 
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1956) (“[C]ourts will not 
question the motives of the questioners.”). 
13 Roberto Iraola, Self-Incrimination and Congressional Hearings, 54 
MERCER L. REV. 939, 949 (2003). See also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-05 
(involving Congress’s power to issue subpoenas); United States v. Di Carlo, 102 
F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (involving Congress’s “power to conduct 
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propriety of a subpoena, the court’s scope of inquiry is limited to 
“determining that a committee’s inquiry may fairly be deemed 
within its province.”14 Further, the manner in which Congress 
elects to conduct its hearings, whether “public or private, and who 
shall be admitted or invited, are questions committed to the 
Congress . . . .”15 This congressional discretion also extends to the 
decision whether or not to permit televised hearings.16 
Although Congress’s power to investigate is broad, the courts 
have cautioned that it is not unlimited.17 Congressional 
investigations “must be related to, and in furtherance of, a 
legitimate task of the Congress.”18 Congress may not conduct 
hearings merely to punish those being investigated, to facilitate the 
“personal aggrandizement of the investigators,” or to delve into the 
private affairs of an individual “without justification in terms of the 
functions of the Congress.”19 As the Supreme Court in Watkins v. 
United States posited, “there is no congressional power to expose 
for the sake of exposure.”20 Further, the authority of an 
investigating committee or subcommittee is limited to the authority 
delegated to it by Congress.21 
                                                          
investigations” and “compel disclosures of facts pertinent to the inquiry”). 
14 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506 (quoting Tenney v. Bradnove, 341 U.S. 367, 
378 (1951)). 
15 Hintz, 193 F. Supp. at 335. 
16 See id. (stating that witnesses have no right to refuse to testify because of 
presence of media); Application of U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270, 1279-80 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that 
the court lacks power to restrict immunity order to testify upon condition that 
“the witnesses . . . testify only outside the presence of television cameras and 
radio microphones”). 
17 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See also Barenblatt 
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“Broad as it is, the power [of 
inquiry] is not, however, without limitations.”). 
18 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
19 Id. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927) (“[N]either 
house is invested with ‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs . . . .”). 
20 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200. 
21 Id. at 206 (“[T]hese committees are restricted to the missions delegated 
to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the Senate in 
coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere.”). 
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Congressional inquiries are also limited by constitutional 
constraints. Witnesses appearing before Congress enjoy the same 
constitutional rights as witnesses appearing in any court of law.22 
Congress must respect the First Amendment rights of speech, 
press, religion, political beliefs, and association; it cannot subject a 
witness to unreasonable searches and seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; and Congress cannot force a witness to 
incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.23 
To effectuate its investigative authority, Congress may exercise 
its contempt power. This power “is the means by which Congress 
responds to certain acts which obstruct the legislative process in 
order to punish the contemnor and/or to remove the obstruction.”24 
Congress may exercise its contempt power in three different 
proceedings. First, both the House and Senate possess the inherent 
power to cite a witness for contempt. Under this procedure, the 
Sergeant-at-Arms brings the person before the House or Senate, 
where he or she is tried, and then, if appropriate, imprisoned in the 
Capitol jail.25 The length of imprisonment is dependent upon the 
purpose of the incarceration. As punishment, the person can be 
imprisoned for a fixed period of time; as a compliance measure, 
the person can only be imprisoned until compliance is achieved, 
but not longer than the end of the congressional session for 
purposes of the House.26 Although available to Congress, this 
process has not been used in more than half a century.27 
                                                          
22 Id. at 188 (“[T]he constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by 
the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of Rights is applicable to 
investigations as to all forms of governmental action.”). 
23 Id. 
24 JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, CONGRESS’ CONTEMPT POWER 1 (2003). 
25 Id. at 2 n.4. 
26 Id. Incarceration in the Capitol jail may be challenged in court through a 
writ of habeas corpus. Id. See also In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 n.27 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
27 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at x. The process is “considered to be 
cumbersome and time-consuming for a modern Congress with a heavy 
legislative workload that would be interrupted by a trial at the bar.” Id. at x. 
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Second, the Senate possesses a civil contempt power.28 Enacted 
as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,29 the Senate’s 
civil contempt power envisions a process in which the Senate 
Legal Counsel applies to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia for an order to adhere to a Senate subpoena, after being 
directed to do so by Senate resolution.30 Refusal to comply with a 
valid subpoena may result in a summary proceeding for contempt 
of court and the imposition of sanctions to achieve compliance.31 
This civil contempt procedure, which does not apply to the 
House,32 was designed to remedy a perceived shortcoming in 
Congress’s existing contempt power, which did not allow “a 
witness to challenge judicially the legality of the inquiry or 
procedures, and then to purge himself of his contempt by testifying 
if his contentions were not judicially upheld.”33 The civil contempt 
process, however, does not apply “to an officer or employee of the 
executive branch of the Federal Government acting within his or 
her official capacity,” unless “the refusal to comply is based on the 
assertion of a personal privilege or objection” rather than an 
authorized invocation of a governmental privilege or objection.34 
Finally, both the House and Senate may use the criminal 
contempt procedures codified at sections 192 and 194 of Title 2 of 
the United States Code. Originally enacted in 1857, section 192 
makes it a misdemeanor offense, punishable by a fine not to 
exceed $1,000 and imprisonment for a period not to exceed twelve 
months, for any person summoned to testify or produce papers by 
                                                          
28 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (2005). 
29 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 19 n.2 (citing Ethics in Government Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 703, 705, 92 Stat. 1877-80 (1978)). 
30 Id. at 19-20. See also 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b), 288d(a) (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 
1365(a) (2005). Alternatively, the Senate may elect to first seek a judicial 
declaration as to the validity of the Senate subpoena or order. SHAMPANSKY, 
supra note 24, at 20 n.5; 2 U.S.C. § 288d(a) (2005). 
31 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 20. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2005). 
32 In the Matter of the Application of the United States Senate Permanent 
Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
33 Id. at 1238 (quoting United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 677 (D.C. 
Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted). 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 2004). 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
  HARM TO MILITARY PROSECUTIONS 289 
 
either House of Congress, who “willfully makes default, or who, 
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the 
question under inquiry . . . .”35 Section 194 establishes the 
procedures to bring the matter to the appropriate United States 
Attorney, “whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the 
grand jury for its action.”36 However, it is unclear whether this 
duty is mandatory or discretionary and whether the U.S. Attorney 
may exercise its prosecutorial discretion and elect not to pursue a 
prosecution.37 
B. Witness Rights 
In terms of witness rights, there are some similarities between a 
Congressional investigation or hearing and a criminal trial. Like 
the criminal defendant, a witness appearing before a congressional 
committee may appear with counsel,38 although the counsel’s role 
may be a limited one.39 Indeed, counsel may appear with the 
                                                          
35 2 U.S.C. § 192; SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 6. The original 
legislation was in response to the refusal of a newspaper reporter to answer 
various questions posed by a select committee. Id. at 13 n.1. 
36 2 U.S.C. § 194 (West 1997 and 2004 Supp.). The procedures require: 
(1) approval by the committee [or subcommittee if appropriate], (2) 
calling up and reading the committee report on the floor; (3) either (if 
Congress is in session) House [or Senate] approval of the resolution 
authorizing the Speaker [or President of the Senate] to certify the report 
to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution, or (if Congress is not in session) 
an independent determination by the Speaker [or President of the 
Senate] to certify the report, [and] (4) certification by the Speaker [or 
President of the Senate] to the appropriate U.S. Attorney for 
prosecution. 
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 14-15. 
37 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 16-17. 
38 See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Ex-Lobbyist Is Assailed At Hearing, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A4 (describing how witnesses to a Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee hearing appeared with legal counsel); OLIVER L. NORTH & WILLIAM 
NOVAK, UNDER FIRE: AN AMERICAN STORY 361 (1991) (stating that during his 
testimony before a select committee during the Iran-Contra hearings, North 
frequently consulted with his attorney). 
39 See Robert J. Giuffra, Representing Your Client In a Congressional 
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witness at all stages of a congressional investigation.40 The 
unrestricted right to the presence of counsel throughout the entire 
investigative process is similar to the rights afforded a military 
defendant in the military justice system, which generally offers 
more procedural protections than does its federal counterpart.41 
A witness appearing before a congressional committee also has 
the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and refuse to answer questions or provide 
evidence.42 At least one court has extended a witness’s right to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to questions posed during 
                                                          
Investigation, 4 BUS. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 1 (Dec. 1997), 
available at 4 No. 11 BUSCRIMB 1 (Westlaw), at *3 (“The witness’s counsel 
normally is a potted plant during the hearings; the active participation of Oliver 
North’s counsel, Brendan Sullivan, during the Iran-Contra hearings was a very 
rare exception to this rule. Don’t expect to be able to raise objections to the 
form—or even to the relevance—of questions.”). 
40 See id. at *2 (“[A] witness’s lawyer can attend a deposition or interview 
conducted by congressional staff.”). 
41 In the federal system, counsel may not accompany his or her client 
during an appearance before the grand jury. SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. 
LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.9, at 
370 (1996 & 1999 Supp.). To consult with an attorney, the witness must first 
leave the grand jury room. Id. In contrast, an “accused” (military defendant) 
may attend the entire Article 32 hearing—the military’s equivalent of the grand 
jury—with counsel, present witnesses and evidence, and cross-examine all 
witnesses. Rule for Courts-Martial 405(f), Manual for Courts-Martial, United 
States (2002 ed.) [hereinafter MCM]. 
42 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (“Witnesses cannot 
be compelled to give evidence against themselves.”). See Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (explaining how the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination “can be asserted in any proceeding . . . .”). See, e.g., 
Dana Milbank, Nobody Sings In This 5th Amendment Stretch, WASH. POST, Mar. 
18, 2005, at A12 (noting how former baseball player, when questioned about 
steroid use by a House committee, “took the Fifth”); Schmidt, supra note 38, at 
A4 (discussing how the witness appearing before a Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee hearing “turn[ed] aside all questions by invoking his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination”); NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, 
at 355 (explaining that during the Iran-Contra hearings, Lt. Col. Oliver North 
declined to answer questions based on his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, until he was granted use immunity). 
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a congressional hearing, to questions whose answer may tend to 
incriminate the witness of state law violations.43 
Although some similarities exist, the legal rights of a witness 
called to testify before a congressional hearing are significantly 
less than those of a defendant in a criminal trial or court-martial. In 
a criminal case, it is generally viewed as improper for a prosecutor 
to force a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination in the presence of the jury in order to create an 
inference of guilt44 and to comment upon that invocation.45 In 
contrast, congressional committees have been known to both force 
a public invocation and to criticize the witness after doing so.46  
                                                          
43 United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1952) 
(during a congressional investigation of state crimes). 
44 Williams v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 271 F. Supp. 2d 696 (V.I. 2003) 
(explaining how a witness asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination “no fewer than 70 times” while under examination by prosecutor). 
See Prosecutorial Misconduct, 91 GEO. L.J. 556, 565 (2003) (“It is improper for 
a prosecutor to call a third-party witness knowing that the witness will invoke 
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the 
jury might improperly infer guilt from the witness’s silence.”); cf. United States 
v. Brown, 12 F.3d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1994) (prosecution made a conscious effort to 
build a case based upon negative inference associated with forced invocation of 
spousal privilege before a jury warranted reversal and raised “the spectre of 
prosecutorial misconduct . . . .”). 
45 United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 538 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is well established. A 
prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant’s 
failure to testify or produce evidence.”); United States v. Riley, 47 M.J. 276 
(1997) (explaining how an agent’s testimony concerning the accused’s 
invocation of his right to remain silent violated the Fifth Amendment and Article 
31 of the UCMJ). See United States v. Miller, 48 M.J. 811, 813 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. 1998) (“[W]hen an accused is interrogated concerning an offense he is 
suspected of committing, his pretrial reliance upon his Article 31 . . . rights may 
not be paraded before a court-martial in order that his guilt may be inferred from 
his refusal to comment on the charges against him.”) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). 
46 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 38, at A4 (“[E]ndured blistering attacks 
from senator after senator.”); Greg Hitt, Senators Vent Frustration at Silence of 
Enron’s Lay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A3 (noting how, after invoking his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, “Mr. Lay was forced to sit 
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Generally, a congressional committee will know in advance if a 
witness intends to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, 
but the committee may still subpoena the witness and require him 
to formally invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.47 
As with certain high-level government officials or leaders of 
regulated corporations,48 the stigma associated with a public 
invocation of the right against self-incrimination may add 
additional practical constraints for an active duty military officer. 
Many persons, both within49 and outside50 the military, believe that 
                                                          
through a series of finger-wagging lectures by 20 committee members, many of 
them frustrated, many mocking”). 
47 Iraola, supra note 13, at 961, 963. 
48 Giuffra, supra note 39, at 1 (“If your client is a senior government 
official or the head of a heavily regulated corporation, he or she may have little 
choice but to answer the committee’s questions. Asserting the Fifth Amendment 
may not be a practical alternative.”). 
49 During his investigation of the My Lai massacre, Lieutenant General 
Peers encountered an Army Major who testified for approximately four hours 
and then unexpectedly invoked his right to remain silent. Peers’s reaction is 
typical of many career military officers: “This greatly bothered me, as it had 
never occurred to me that a Regular Army officer would not testify when called 
to do so by a properly appointed investigating officer. It was beyond the realm 
of what I considered professional military ethics.” W.R. PEERS, THE MY LAI 
INQUIRY 161 (1979). 
50 During the Iran-Contra hearings, Senator Warren Rudman was outraged 
when Lt. Col. North invoked his Fifth Amendment right while in his Marine 
Corps uniform. WARREN B. RUDMAN, COMBAT: TWELVE YEARS IN THE U.S. 
SENATE 138 (1996) (“[I]t remained a sorry spectacle to see it invoked by a 
uniformed marine officer who was sworn to defend his country and uphold its 
laws.”). Robert McFarlane, a retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel and President 
Reagan’s National Security Advisor, also found North’s behavior disappointing. 
ROBERT MCFARLANE & ZOFIA SMARDZ, SPECIAL TRUST 349 (1994) (“I had 
found his behavior disappointing since the scandal had broken—refusing to 
testify before the Tower Board or the Senate and House intelligence committees, 
citing the Fifth Amendment, and now demanding immunity before agreeing to 
appear before the select committees.”). North was also uncomfortable about 
invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and did so after 
being persuaded to do so by his attorneys. NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at 
355-56. However, at the conclusion of the Iran-Contra prosecutions, McFarlane, 
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invoking one’s constitutional rights during an investigation 
constitutes behavior inconsistent with that expected of a 
professional military officer. 
Congressional hearings also differ from criminal trials in that 
there are no fixed rules of evidence and Congress may determine 
its own procedural rules for such proceedings.51 Accordingly, a 
congressional committee or subcommittee need not permit a 
witness to cross-examine other witnesses or to call witnesses of his 
or her own.52 Indeed, witnesses are not typically afforded these 
opportunities.53 Also, a person called before a congressional 
investigation or hearing does not enjoy many of the legal 
protections of the criminal defendant. Although no published case 
has directly addressed the issue, the general consensus is that there 
exists no legal right to invoke common law privileges during a 
congressional investigation.54 However, committees frequently 
                                                          
who had completely cooperated during the various Iran-Contra investigations, 
eventually pled “guilty to four misdemeanor counts of unlawfully withholding 
material information from Congress.” MCFARLANE & SMARDZ, supra at 359. In 
contrast, North’s convictions for “obstructing Congress, destroying official 
documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity,” were set aside on appeal. Id. at 
362. 
51 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 29 (“[P]ursuant to art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 of 
the Constitution, each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings.”). 
52 Id. 
53 Iraola, supra note 13, at 957 (“[W]itnesses appearing before 
congressional committees typically are not afforded the opportunity to present 
evidence or to cross-examine other witnesses who they believe may have 
defamed them.”). 
54 Cf. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, Inc., 421 U.S. 491, 515 (1975) 
(Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining how, after 
receiving a subpoena, a witness who “refuses to testify or to produce documents 
and invokes a pertinent privilege . . . runs the risk that the legislature will cite 
him for contempt”). See also SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 29 (“Although 
there is no court case directly on point, it appears that congressional committees 
are not legally required to allow a witness to decline to testify on the basis of 
such a testimonial privilege.”); John P. Reilly, Privilege Claims For The ‘Bliley’ 
Documents: Mixed Rulings Imperil Basic Principles, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 50, 53 
(Jan. 2002) (“But the limited authorities available demonstrate that Congress 
may lawfully disregard common law claims of attorney-client privilege and 
compel production of privileged testimony and documents.”). Also, during the 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
294 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
observe common law privileges as an exercise of discretion.55 
Various defenses that may be available in a criminal trial may 
not be available to a witness appearing before a congressional 
subcommittee. For example, reliance on the advice of counsel, 
after a full disclosure of all material facts, serves as a defense to 
the mens rea element of a crime.56 This defense has been expressly 
recognized by federal,57 military58 and state courts.59 However, it 
does not serve as a defense to failing to answer a pertinent question 
posed by a congressional committee.60 As early as 1929, in 
                                                          
Iran-Contra hearings, in an exchange with Senator Inouye, Brendan Sullivan, 
who represented Oliver North, exclaimed: “I know Congress doesn’t recognize 
attorney-client privilege, a husband-and-wife privilege, priest-penitent privilege. 
I know those things are all out the window.” NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at 
363. 
55 SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 30 (“[T]he decision as to whether or not 
to allow such a claim of privilege turn[s] on a ‘weighing [of] the legislative need 
for disclosure against possible resulting injury.’”) (citation omitted). However, 
in at least one instance during a 1986 investigation by the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, the committee rejected the assertion of the attorney-client 
privilege, believing it inapplicable, and cited the witnesses for contempt. Id. 
56 United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 382 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
57 United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 959 (8th Cir. 1981) (advice of 
counsel “should be considered in determining whether the defendant’s actions 
were willful.”). See United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 
1993) (recognizing the defense, but finding that the evidence did not warrant a 
jury instruction). 
58 Advice of counsel leads to actions giving rise to obstruction of justice 
conviction; overturned on basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. United 
States v. Sorbera, 43 M.J. 818 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996). See United States v. 
Jackson, 30 M.J. 687 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (noting that reliance on the advice of 
counsel as a defense results in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege); cf. 
United States v. Hicks, 52 M.J. 70, 74 (1999) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting 
how attorney who gave bad advice that lead to court-martial charges “most 
likely” could have been called as a defense witness on the merits and such 
evidence “certainly should have been brought out at the sentencing 
hearing . . . .”). 
59 See State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Minn. 2005); State v. Ross, 
659 N.W.2d 122, 130-31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Commonwealth v. Garrity, 682 
N.E.2d 937, 941-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). 
60 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), overruled by United 
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Sinclair v. United States,61 the Supreme Court held that advice of 
counsel serves as no defense to a charge of unlawfully refusing to 
answer a pertinent question by a committee of Congress.62 The 
Court in Sinclair reasoned that because “[t]he gist of the offense is 
the refusal to answer pertinent questions,” and since “[n]o moral 
turpitude is involved,” all that need be established is the 
“intentional violation” of the law.63 Further, advice of counsel has 
been rejected as a defense to failure to respond to a congressional 
subpoena.64 
Witnesses may only be required to answer questions 
“pertinent” to the investigating committee’s authorized area of 
inquiry.65 However, because a witness is potentially liable to 
criminal prosecution pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 192, for “refus[ing] to 
                                                          
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 507 (1995); Licavoli v. United States, 294 F.2d 
207 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (“It has been established ever since the Sinclair case that 
reliance upon advice of counsel is no defense to a charge of failing to answer a 
pertinent question . . . .”). In Gaudin, the Court overruled Sinclair’s holding that 
a court, rather than a jury, could determine the “pertinency” of a question posed 
by Congress for purposes of 2 U.S.C. § 192, “making it criminal contempt of 
Congress to refuse to answer a ‘question pertinent to [a] question under 
[congressional] inquiry.” 515 U.S. at 519. In Gaudin, the Court held that the 
“materiality” of an allegedly false statement was to be decided by a jury, rather 
than by a judge. Id. at 506. 
61 279 U.S. 263 (1929). 
62 Id. at 299. The Court also held that a mistake of law failed to serve as a 
defense. Id. 
63 Id. Sinclair had been convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192, which made 
it a misdemeanor offense for any “person who having been summoned as a 
witness by the authority of either House of Congress, to give testimony or to 
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any 
committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having 
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under 
inquiry . . . .” Id. at 284 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §192). 
64 Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[H]is 
failure to respond to the subpoena was the result of his own legal opinion based 
upon consultation with his unnamed counsel is no defense.”). 
65 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (“No witness can be 
compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area. This is a 
jurisdictional concept of pertinency drawn from the nature of a congressional 
committee’s source of authority.”). 
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answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,” such 
witness must be placed on fair notice as to the parameters of the 
authorized area of inquiry.66 The adequacy of that notice is 
measured by the same “degree of explicitness and certitude that the 
Due Process requires in the expression of any element of a 
criminal offense.”67 
For purposes of a congressional investigation, notice to the 
witness may be found in the “authorizing resolution, the remarks 
of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature 
of the proceedings themselves . . . .”68 When the subject matter of 
the investigation has not been “made to appear with undisputable 
clarity,” a witness may object to the pertinency of a question and 
require that the committee “state for the record the subject under 
inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded 
questions are pertinent thereto.”69 Further, the witness may seek 
the “connective reasoning” between the question and the subject 
matter of the investigation.70 
II. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE JENCKS ACT AND BRADY 
V. MARYLAND 
The applicability of the Jencks Act, and to a lesser extent, 
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, to the military justice system 
was a significant issue during the courts-martial conducted in the 
wake of the My Lai massacre. Indeed, in the court-martial of Staff 
                                                          
66 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 208-09 (explaining that a witness is “entitled to 
have knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent.”). 
Before a witness may be convicted for failing to answer a pertinent question, the 
witness’s “awareness of the pertinency of the information” must be 
contemporaneous with the witness’s refusal to answer the question. Id. at 217 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In a prosecution for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192, 
“[p]ertinency is an element of the offense,” which must be established by the 
United States. United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Ohio 
1952). 
67 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 214-15. 
70 Id. at 215. 
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Sergeant David Mitchell, the military judge’s interpretation of the 
government’s Jencks Act obligations, with regard to evidence in 
the possession of a congressional subcommittee, proved fatal to the 
prosecution.71 
Generally, the Jencks Act requires the United States to produce 
to the defense any statement in its possession of a witness who has 
testified for the prosecution in a criminal case. The government’s 
disclosure obligation is triggered only after a witness has 
testified,72 and the defense has moved for production of that 
witness’s prior statements.73 The Jencks Act requires that the 
sought-after statements relate “to the subject matter as to which the 
witness has testified.”74 The government’s failure to satisfy its 
Jencks Act obligations may result in a court striking the testimony 
of a witness or declaring a mistrial.75 The requirements of the 
Jencks Act are contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
26.276 and, for the military, in Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 
914.77 
Another disclosure requirement, the Brady obligation, is 
mandated by case law. In Brady v. Maryland,78 the Supreme Court 
required the government to disclose specifically requested 
                                                          
71 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (explaining that the government’s disclosure 
obligation is not triggered “until said witness has testified on direct examination 
in the trial of the case”). 
73 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). 
74 Id. 
75 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d). 
76 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CRIMINAL § 436 (3d. ed. 2000). 
77 See United States v. Moravec, No. NMCM 200000202, 2002 WL 
31656114, at *4 n.6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App., Nov. 20, 2002) (“R.C.M. 914, the 
military equivalent of the Jencks Act.”); United States v. Cook, No. ACM33615, 
2001 WL 85804, at *6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App., Jan. 29, 2001) (R.C.M. 914 “is 
based upon the Jencks Act.”). The Rules for Courts-Martial “govern the 
procedures and punishments in all courts-martial and, whenever expressly 
provided, preliminary, supplementary, and appellate procedures and activities.” 
MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 101(a). 
78 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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exculpatory evidence that is material either to the defendant’s guilt 
or punishment.79 The failure to make such a disclosure “violates 
due process . . . irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”80 In United States v. Agurs,81 the Court held that this 
disclosure duty existed even when no specific request had been 
made for such evidence.82 Further, in United States v. Bagley,83 the 
Court extended the disclosure obligation to include not only 
exculpatory evidence, but also impeachment evidence.84 
Significantly, the Court has also imposed an obligation on “the 
individual prosecutor . . . to learn of any favorable evidence known 
to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case . . . .”85 
A. My Lai Massacre Courts-Martial 
On March 16, 1968, Task Force Barker, a battalion-sized unit 
from the 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, conducted a 
search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Son My village, 
Republic of South Vietnam, which the Americans believed was 
occupied by the Viet Cong.86 Charlie Company87 of that Task 
Force assaulted My Lai, a hamlet of the village, eventually killing 
between 175-200 Vietnamese civilians, consisting “almost 
exclusively of old men, women and children.”88 The killings 
                                                          
79 Id. at 87. 
80 Id. 
81 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
82 Id. at 107. 
83 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
84 Id. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, 
falls within the Brady rule.”). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 
(1995) (“[T]he Court disavowed any difference between exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence for Brady purposes . . . .”). 
85 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
86 GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 325 (1978). 
87 Charlie Company, also known as C Company, was a unit consisting of 
approximately 180 men. MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL: 
THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL OF LIEUTENANT CALLEY 41 
(2002). 
88 LEWY, supra note 86, at 326. Task Force Barker was responsible for the 
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occurred despite the absence of the anticipated Viet Cong unit.89 
Charlie Company “received no hostile fire from the village.”90 
The massacre only came to light after a Vietnam veteran, 
Ronald Ridenhour, wrote various military and civilian officials on 
March 29, 1969, about reports of misconduct he had received 
concerning My Lai.91 The Ridenhour letter caused the Army Chief 
of Staff, General William Westmoreland, to direct an Army 
Inspector General (IG) investigation of the incident.92 After the IG 
established that criminal misconduct had occurred, General 
Westmoreland transferred the investigation to the Army’s Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID), whose additional investigative 
efforts ultimately lead to charges being brought against a number 
of soldiers,93 including one of Charlie Company’s platoon leaders, 
Lieutenant William Calley.94 
While the CID investigation was proceeding, General 
Westmoreland remained concerned about the possibility of a 
cover-up and the public perception that the Army was not 
diligently investigating the massacre.95 Despite some initial 
                                                          
deaths of approximately 400 Vietnamese. Id. 
89 Id. (“[N]o enemy forces were encountered.”). 
90 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 23 (C.M.A. 1973). 
91 LEWY, supra note 86, at 326. See also PEERS, supra note 49, at 7 (“His 
letter proved to be the key to uncovering the tragedy, and had he not sent it, it is 
conceivable that the My Lai incident would have remained hidden to this day.”). 
92 PEERS, supra note 49, at 8. Upon receiving the letter, General 
Westmoreland directed that immediate inquiries be made in Vietnam and when 
initial reports suggested “something untoward might have happened,” directed 
an IG investigation. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 375 
(1976). Although Westmoreland was Army Chief of Staff at the time Ridenhour 
reported the incident, the General had been the senior Army commander in 
Vietnam when the massacre actually occurred. PEERS, supra note 49, at 241. 
93 Ultimately the CID investigation caused the Army to charge four officers 
and nine soldiers, of which two officers and three soldiers were eventually 
brought to trial. WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375. 
94 PEERS, supra note 49, at 8, 18 (“[T]he charges against Lieutenant Calley 
grew out of an investigation by the Criminal Investigation Division”). 
95 Id. at 8-9. See WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375 (“. . . possibility 
that officers of the 11th Brigade and the Americal Division had either covered up 
the incident or failed to make a comprehensive investigation.”). 
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resistance from members of the Nixon administration,96 
Westmoreland and Army Secretary Stanley Resor elected to 
proceed with an additional formal investigation to be lead by 
Lieutenant General William R. Peers.97 Ultimately this 
investigative effort became known as the Peers Commission. The 
Peers Commission produced a detailed report on the massacre that 
consisted of “some 20,000 pages of testimony from almost 400 
witnesses, and, in addition, contained 240 photographs, 119 Army 
directives and over 100 miscellaneous documents.”98 Even the 
congressional subcommittee conducting a parallel investigation 
ultimately acknowledged that the report was “very thorough.”99 
Clearly the Army was capable of investigating the incident. 
In addition to the Army’s investigation, Congress elected to 
launch its own investigation. Although several House and Senate 
committees sought to conduct the investigation, the task eventually 
fell to the House Armed Services Committee.100 On November 26, 
1969, the same day that the Army announced the creation of the 
Peers Commission, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of 
the House Armed Services Committee initiated its investigation.101 
Within a matter of weeks, the Committee received testimony from 
                                                          
96 WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375 (“When I learned that some 
members of President Nixon’s administration wanted to whitewash any possible 
negligence within the chain of command, I threatened through a White House 
official to exercise my prerogative as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go 
personally to the President and object.”); PEERS, supra note 49, at 3 n.1 
(Westmoreland “encountered considerable resistance from within the 
Department of Defense, which he strongly suspected had originated in the White 
House.”). 
97 WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375-76. 
98 Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 221 (5th Cir. 1975). 
99 Id. 
100 PEERS, supra note 49, at 19. See also MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE 
VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL: THE MAI LAI MASSACRE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL 
OF LIEUTENANT CALLEY 137 (2002) (“[S]everal Senate and House committees 
vied for the right to investigate the My Lai incident.”). 
101 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137. Representative Rivers had also 
received a letter from Ridenhour. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184 
(A.C.M.R. 1973), aff’d 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973). 
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several individuals in executive session, including Peers who 
appeared before it to give a background briefing and who also 
requested that no witnesses be called to testify by that body before 
the Peers Commission had questioned them.102 Also called to 
testify by the Committee was Captain Ernest Medina, the Charlie 
Company commander during the assault on My Lai.103 
Subsequently, on December 19, 1969 a subcommittee under 
the leadership of Representative F. Edward Hebert was formed to 
investigate My Lai, which initially limited itself to staff interviews 
of witnesses until it began formal hearings six months later.104 
Almost immediately after being created, however, the 
Congressional subcommittee sent requests to the Army to arrange 
for the testimony of witnesses, many of whom had not yet been 
questioned by Peers.105 Some of the witnesses Hebert’s 
subcommittee sought to question were either material witnesses or 
were pending charges.106 
Army Secretary Resor offered to provide the subcommittee 
with transcripts of testimony taken by the Army and requested that 
the subcommittee delay its questioning so as not to interfere with 
the Army’s courts-martial and prejudice the rights of the military 
defendants.107 In letters to Hebert in December, January and April, 
Secretary Resor opined “that discharge of our responsibility to 
execute the laws will be imperiled by such actions as your 
subcommittee now contemplates.”108 Hebert refused to desist and 
his subcommittee issued subpoenas compelling testimony, 
eventually interviewing more than 150 witnesses.109 Included 
among those questioned were Captain Medina, Charlie Company 
commander; Medina’s brigade commander, Colonel Oran K. 
                                                          
102 PEERS, supra note 49, at 20. See also BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137-
38. 
103 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137. 
104 PEERS, supra note 49, at 22. 
105 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 139. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
109 Id. 
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Henderson; and Major General Samuel W. Koster, the Americal 
Division commander.110 Later, both Medina and Henderson were 
tried, but acquitted, at their courts-martial.111 
At the conclusion of the hearings, Secretary Resor requested 
that witness’ transcripts be turned over to the Army, but Hebert 
refused, citing assurances the subcommittee made to the witnesses 
that “their testimony would not be disclosed voluntarily to anyone 
outside the subcommittee.”112 Such assurances had been made in 
order to obtain “frank and complete statements from the 
witnesses . . . .”113 When the military courts issued subpoenas for 
the transcripts for use at trial, Hebert again refused, positing that 
the transcripts would not be released until all courts-martial that 
might arise from the My Lai massacre were complete.114 
The motivation behind Hebert’s refusal to release the 
transcripts has been the subject of dispute. One author opined that 
“Hebert’s subcommittee seemed more interested in discrediting 
those who had exposed the war crimes committed at My Lai than 
in ensuring that those responsible for them were punished.”115 The 
subcommittee “badgered” and “grilled” Ronald Haeberle, a former 
combat photographer, about his failure to report the massacre and 
his use of photographs from a personal camera.116 When Warrant 
Officer Hugh Thompson testified, Hebert “interrogated him 
mercilessly about whether he had ordered his crew to shoot at 
other American soldiers” and about the citations for medals that 
Thompson and his crew had received for rescuing Vietnamese 
civilians from the massacre.117 General Peers characterized the 
                                                          
110 Id. at 140. 
111 PEERS, supra note 49, at photo insert. 
112 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 142. 
113 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
114 Id. (Hebert “treated the transcripts as classified documents and refused 
to allow their release ‘until final disposition has been made of all criminal cases 
now pending which may arise from the My Lai affair.’”). 
115 Id. at 140. The Nixon Administration viewed Hebert as an ally in their 
effort to discredit Ridenhour. Id. at 137. 
116 Id. at 140-41. 
117 Id. at 141. A helicopter pilot, Thompson evacuated approximately a 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
  HARM TO MILITARY PROSECUTIONS 303 
 
questioning of Thompson as “more of an inquisition than an 
investigation.”118 Additionally, Peers reported that at the initial 
stages of the congressional investigation, Chairman Rivers 
confidently told him: “You know our boys would never do 
anything like that.”119 
In contrast, Hebert interrupted the questioning of Medina when 
another subcommittee member, Congressman Stratton, forcefully 
pressed the former Charlie Company commander about the 
instructions he had given to his soldiers.120 When General Koster’s 
attorney objected to Stratton’s “rigorous” questioning of the former 
Americal Division commander, Hebert admonished Stratton “to 
ask him affirmative questions, without an effort to impeach his 
testimony.”121 Additionally, both Rivers and Hebert publicly 
criticized the Army for pursuing courts-martial against those 
soldiers involved in the massacre.122 
Regardless of the motivation underlying the subcommittee’s 
position, Hebert’s refusal to release the transcripts affected at least 
three courts-martial, and in the court-martial of Staff Sergeant 
David Mitchell, the refusal proved fatal for the prosecution. 
Mitchell had been a squad leader in Calley’s first platoon during 
the My Lai incident.123  On October 6, 1970, the court-martial of 
Sergeant Mitchell began. Shortly thereafter, the military judge 
ruled in favor of the defense to suppress testimony based on a 
violation of the Jencks Act.124 The military judge determined that 
because of the Hebert subcommittee’s refusal to release testimony 
transcripts, no one who testified before that subcommittee would 
                                                          
dozen civilians from My Lai to safety while the massacre was ongoing. PEERS, 
supra note 49, at 71. 
118 PEERS, supra note 49, at 242. 
119 Id. at 21. 
120 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 140. 
121 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
122 Id. at 141-42. 
123 United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1147 n.14 (A.C.M.R. 1973), 
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973). 
124 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 224. 
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be permitted to testify at Mitchell’s court-martial.125 With his case 
now severely hamstrung, the military trial counsel (prosecutor) 
could call only three of the numerous witnesses that he originally 
contemplated.126 In contrast, Mitchell’s lawyer put on a robust 
defense, calling over twenty witnesses including the accused.127 
Not surprisingly, the military panel returned a verdict of not 
guilty.128 
The second court-martial impacted by Hebert’s refusal to 
release transcripts was that of Sergeant Charles Hutto, which began 
in January 1971. Hutto had been a machine gunner in Charlie 
Company’s second platoon.129 Unlike the military judge in 
Mitchell’s court-martial, however, the court denied the defense’s 
Jencks Act motion.130  The defense presented a superior orders 
defense, buttressed by the testimony of a clinical psychologist who 
testified that Hutto “lacked the capacity to make a judgment 
concerning whether [a directive to kill all the people] was legal or 
illegal.”131 Even without a Jencks Act problem, the Army was 
unable to obtain a conviction. After deliberating less than two 
hours, the military jury acquitted Hutto.132 
The third, and best known, court-martial affected by the Hebert 
refusal was that of Lieutenant William Calley. On the day of the 
May Lai massacre, Calley commanded Charlie Company’s first 
platoon. After an extensive trial, Calley was “convicted of the 
premeditated murder of 22 infants, children, women, and old men, 
and of assault with intent to commit murder a child of about 2 
years of age.”133 On appeal to the Army Court of Military Review, 
Calley challenged his convictions, in part, based on an alleged 
                                                          
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 224-25. 
128 Id. at 225. 
129 Id. at 65. 
130 BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 225. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 226. 
133 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 21 (C.M.A. 1973). 
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violation of the Jencks Act and Brady disclosure obligations.134 
The day after the subcommittee had published its report, and 
four months prior to the beginning of the Calley court-martial on 
the merits, the defense filed a motion seeking “production of ‘[a]ll 
witness testimony and documentary evidence in the custody of the 
House of Representatives . . . .’”135 In response to a letter from the 
trial counsel, Representative Hebert refused to produce testimony 
and other evidence, positing that because Congress was a separate 
branch of Government, the subcommittee documents were neither 
subject to Brady nor to the Jencks Act.136 The military judge 
denied the defense motion for discovery, finding that all witness 
testimony and statements within the Army’s possession had been 
furnished to the defense and that the Government offered to pay 
for travel expenses associated with witness interviews.137 Without 
reaching the issue of Jencks Act applicability to Congress, the 
military judge issued a “precatory order” that sought all “evidence 
given to the investigating committee by named prosecution 
witnesses.”138 Two months later, the military judge reissued its 
order to the newly convened Congress with a subpoena, but the 
material was never released.139 Eventually, of the sixteen witnesses 
                                                          
134 United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 131, 1138, 1184-95 n.14 (A.C.M.R. 
1973), aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 (C.M.A. 1973). The A.C.M.R. is the Army’s 
intermediate level appellate authority, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces (formerly the U.S. Court of Military Appeals). MCM, supra 
note 41, R.C.M. 1203-1204. The Supreme Court serves as the final appellate 
court. Id. R.C.M. 1205. 
135 Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1186. 
136 Id. Hebert did provide a witness list of those who had testified. Id. 
Shortly thereafter, the defense expanded its request for production for “all that 
Congress possessed relative to My Lai,” citing not only Brady and the Jencks 
Act, but also the Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 
inherent power of the court. Id. 
137 Id. at 1186-87. 
138 Id. at 1187. “As directed to the House the order was necessarily 
precatory; for Judge Kennedy cited therein his recognition of the Constitutional 
provision that a House may except from publication such part of the journal of 
its proceedings as in its judgment requires secrecy . . . .” Id. 
139 Id. 
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who were called to testify at the Calley court-martial, eleven had 
been called by the trial counsel (prosecutor) and also testified in 
executive session before the Hebert subcommittee.140 
Addressing the alleged violation of the Jencks Act, in what the 
court characterized as a case of first impression,141 the Army Court 
of Military Review (ACMR) determined that the Act did “not 
pertain to statements given to the Congress.”142 The court 
interpreted the term “United States” in the Jencks Act to refer to 
the sovereign as prosecutor acting through the executive branch.143 
In further support of its conclusion that the term “United States” 
referred only to the executive branch, the court noted that the 
enforcement mechanism of a defendant’s right to inspect was 
through a court order, but a court had no authority to order the 
House to release its records.144 
Finally, the court was concerned that inclusion of the 
legislative branch within the scope of the Jencks Act would violate 
the separation of powers doctrine.145 Here the court reasoned that: 
[I]f a committee called all the witnesses before the 
prosecution commenced criminal litigation, if the 
committee declined to release the testimony it heard, and if 
the Jencks Act is held to apply, the effect would be to 
preclude the prosecution’s proving its case. This would be 
an inroad of constitutional dimensions upon the executive 
                                                          
140 United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 131, 1138, 1185 (A.C.M.R. 1973), 
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 (C.M.A. 1973). 
141 Id. at 1191. 
142 Id. at 1192. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1192-93. Since at least 1951, military courts have possessed the 
authority to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses at a court-martial 
through issuance of a warrant of attachment. United States v. Hinton, 21 M.J. 
267, 270 (C.M.A. 1986). Failure to appear before a court-martial is a federal 
offense. Id. at 269 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 847). However, these procedures do not 
apply when a witness cannot be compelled to appear. Id. at 271 n.8. The 
enforceability of a subpoena duces tecum “is in virtually every respect identical 
to a request for production of a witness.” United States v. Rodriguez, 57 M.J. 
765, 770 (N-M.Ct. Crim. App. 2002), aff’d, 60 M.J. 239 (2004). 
145 Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1193-94. 
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and judicial functions.146 
As a precautionary measure, the court also concluded that if the 
Jencks Act did apply, that any error by the trial court in failing to 
enforce it was harmless.147 
Since Calley was unsuccessful in exploiting the Jencks Act as 
grounds for appeal within the military system,148 Calley sought 
habeas corpus relief in federal district court.149 In Calley v. 
Callaway,150 the district court found Calley’s convictions 
“constitutionally invalid,” and ordered his release from military 
custody.151 As part of its analysis, the court disagreed with the 
decision of the ACMR that the Jencks Act did not apply to 
testimony given before a Congressional subcommittee and posited 
that the testimony of those witnesses who testified before Hebert’s 
subcommittee and at Calley’s court-martial should have been 
stricken.152 Further, the court reasoned that even if the Jencks Act 
was inapplicable, “there nevertheless was a clear violation of 
[Calley’s] constitutional right to confrontation and compulsory 
process resulting from the refusal of the Congress to honor the 
subpoenas issued by the military judge.”153 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
                                                          
146 Id. at 1194. 
147 Id. at 1195. 
148 The U.S Court of Military Appeals did not address the alleged Jencks 
Act violation. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973). 
Calley’s attorneys filed “a massive 422-page petition for review, raising thirty 
issues,” but the court elected to hear only three. BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 
240. 
149 By the time of the habeas corpus petition, Calley was on parole. Calley 
v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 191 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975). The military panel (jury) 
sentenced Calley to life, which was reduced to twenty years by the convening 
authority, and further reduced to ten years by the Secretary of the Army and then 
released on parole. Id. at 190, 91 n.5. 
150 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974). 
151 Id. at 712-13. 
152 Id. at 700-01. The court also found that Calley was denied his 
constitutional rights because of the massive pretrial publicity and because the 
military charges were improper. Id. at 650. 
153 Id. at 701. 
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Circuit reversed.154 Addressing the subcommittee’s refusal to 
release witness testimony, the court concluded “that there was no 
denial of due process in the failure to supply the prior testimony, 
and even if a Jencks Act violation occurred, it does not rise to a 
level warranting habeas corpus relief.”155 The court noted the 
Army’s liberal discovery procedures, that the defense had been 
provided with testimony and statements gathered during several 
investigations, had been granted access to the entire Peers report, 
and that the defense had been permitted to conduct an independent 
investigation at government expense.156 The court pointed out that 
“[t]he discovery by the defense was so extensive that, of the 13 
witnesses appearing before both the Hebert Subcommittee and the 
court-martial, the defense already possessed at least two prior 
statements, and often more, from all 13 witnesses save one, for 
whom they possessed one prior statement.”157 Given these 
circumstances, the court concluded that it was “impossible” to find 
a due process violation.158 The court easily turned aside the 
argument that the failure to produce testimony from the Hebert 
hearings violated Brady, finding that the defense had failed to 
establish materiality.159 
B. Current State of Military Law 
Calley was the last case in which the applicability of the Jencks 
Act to the military was addressed in the context of a congressional 
investigation or hearing. Since Calley, however, military 
jurisprudence has developed sufficiently to resolve future issues of 
applicability should the issue arise again in the future. 
The military justice system employs a liberal system of 
discovery and disclosure, which is “designed to be broader than in 
civilian life [and] provide the accused, at a minimum, with the 
                                                          
154 Calley, 519 F.2d at 184. 
155 Id. at 220. 
156 Id. at 220-21. 
157 Id. at 221. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 222. 
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disclosure and discovery rights available in federal civilian 
proceedings.”160 Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, for example, mandates equal access to evidence for both 
the prosecution and defense.161 Additionally, the courts have held 
that the Jencks Act applies to the military justice system.162 
Critical to any analysis of the Government’s obligation to 
produce testimony or other witness statements in the possession of 
Congress, is the limitation of 18 U.S.C.A § 3500(b), and 
implementing R.C.M. 914(a)(1), that the statement be “in the 
possession of the United States.”163 Since its earlier decision in 
Calley, the ACMR has reaffirmed its position that statements in the 
possession of the United States for Jencks Act purposes are limited 
to statements in the possession of prosecutors and those persons 
acting in an official investigatory capacity.164 
                                                          
160 United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 440 (1999). See also United 
States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321 (2004) (“The military justice system provides 
for broader discovery than required by practice in federal civilian criminal 
trials.”). For an overview of the modern day military justice system, see 
generally MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW 
(1999). 
161 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 846, Art. 46 (2002). 
Article 46, and its implementing RCM 701, afford broader discovery rights 
“than that required by the Constitution under Brady v. Maryland . . . or 
otherwise available to federal defendants in civilian trials under Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 12 and 16.” United States v. Shelton, 59 M.J. 727, 734 
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2004). 
162 United States v. Marsh, 21 M.J. 445, 451 (C.M.A. 1986) (“It is now 
well-established that the Jencks Act applies to trials by court-martial.”); United 
States v. Gomez, 15 M.J. 954, 962 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (“The Jencks Act applies in 
the military . . . .”). See United States v. Longstreath, 42 M.J. 806, 818 (N-M.Ct. 
Crim. App. 1995) (discussing the Government’s obligations under R.C.M. 
701(a)(2) and the Jencks Act). 
163 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); MCM, supra note 
41, R.C.M. 914(a)(1). 
164 United States v. Ali, 12 M.J. 1018, 1019-20 (A.C.M.R. 1982) 
(concluding that a company commander has investigative duties and thus the 
Jencks Act may apply to a statement in his possession). See also United States v. 
Gomez, 15 M.J. 954, 964 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (applies only to statements in the 
possession of those persons “engaged in the prosecutorial function.”). 
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The ACMR’s position is consistent with applicable federal165 
and state166 case law, including at least one Watergate-era case that 
interpreted the Act in the context of testimony rendered before a 
Congressional subcommittee. In United States v. Ehrlichman,167 G. 
Gordon Liddy moved to strike the testimony of E. Howard Hunt, a 
prosecution witness who had also testified in executive session 
before the Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed 
Services Committee. Liddy’s motion was based in part on the 
Jencks Act because Hunt’s congressional testimony had not been 
produced to the defense.168 The congressional subcommittee 
declined to produce the testimony in response to two separate 
subpoenas that Liddy caused to be issued.169 
The court denied the motion to strike, holding that the Jencks 
Act was not applicable to the congressional testimony.170 The court 
posited: “there is no indication that Congress intended it to 
encompass its own legislative proceedings held in executive 
session, and its previous and continued resistance to subpoenas 
duces tecum argues strongly to the contrary.”171 On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
avoided the issue of Jencks Act applicability and simply found that 
Liddy suffered no prejudice by the subcommittee’s failure to 
produce witness transcripts.172 
Similarly, Brady obligations apply to the military justice 
system, as codified in the Manual for Court-Martial (RCM 701).173 
In pertinent part, RCM 701 requires “[t]he trial counsel [to] 
                                                          
165 United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the 
prosecutorial division of the government”; “in the hands of the federal 
prosecutor”). 
166 See, e.g. Robinson v. State, 730 A.2d 181, 186 (Md. 1999) (Maryland, 
which follows the Jencks Act, defines statements in its possession to those held 
by “the prosecution or the prosecutorial arm of the government . . . .”). 
167 389 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974). 
168 Id. at 96. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 97. 
171 Id. 
172 United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
173 United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 440 (1999). 
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disclose to the defense . . . evidence known to the trial counsel 
which reasonably tends to: (A) Negate the guilt of the accused of 
an offense charged; (B) Reduce the degree of guilt of the accused 
of an offense charged; or (C) Reduce the punishment.”174 
With respect to any future dispute involving testimony or other 
information in Congress’s control, assuming that the sought after 
testimony were deemed material, the few military courts to have 
addressed this issue appear to follow a line of analysis similar to 
that found with the Jencks Act.175 
In United States v. Williams, the military court reasoned that a 
threshold question as to the government’s obligation to produce 
discoverable information for purposes of R.C.M. 701 and Brady 
“is whether the information at issue was located within the 
parameters of the files that the prosecution must review for 
exculpatory material.”176 Generally, the prosecution must conduct 
a due diligence search of its own files, files of other participating 
law enforcement authorities, investigative files of related cases 
“maintained by an entity ‘closely aligned with the’ prosecution,” 
and certain other files if “designated in a defense discovery 
request, that involved a specified type of information within a 
specified entity.”177 “To the extent that relevant files are known to 
be under the control of another governmental entity [e.g. 
Congress], the prosecution must make that fact known to the 
defense and engage in ‘good faith efforts’ to obtain the 
material.”178 In short, congressional testimony should not be 
deemed to be in the possession of the government for Brady 
purposes and the government’s obligation is limited to making a 
good faith effort to obtain it. 
This was the position taken by the District Court of the District 
of Columbia in the case of United States v. Ehrlichman.179 In that 
                                                          
174 MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 701(a)(6). 
175 United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436 (1999). See United States v. 
Tillmon, 1999 WL 1005923, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 1999). 
176 Williams, 50 M.J. at 440. 
177 Id. at 441. 
178 Id. 
179 389 F. Supp. 95, 95 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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case the court held that Brady did not apply: “The subpoenaed 
testimony is not in the possession of the Government within the 
meaning of that decision, since the Subcommittee is neither an 
investigative nor a prosecutorial arm of the Executive Branch nor 
an agency of the Government in any way involved in the offense or 
related transaction.”180 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO GRANT IMMUNITY 
AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH A GRANT ON FUTURE OR PARALLEL 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
A congressional grant of immunity poses a significant threat to 
the government’s ability to obtain a conviction against an 
immunized witness who testifies before a congressional hearing. 
This is particularly so if the hearing is well publicized, because of 
the enormous burden placed on prosecutors to establish that they 
did not benefit from immunized testimony. Indeed, two of the 
principle defendants in the Iran Contra scandal prosecutions were 
able to obtain reversals of their convictions because the 
prosecution was unable to satisfy this standard. Accordingly, this 
article reviews Congress’s immunity power and the impact grants 
of immunity can have on the criminal justice system. 
A. Overview of Congress’s Authority to Grant Immunity 
If two-thirds of its members agree, a congressional committee 
may grant “use” immunity to a witness.181 However, 18 U.S.C. § 
                                                          
180 Id. at 97. On appeal, the court declined to address the applicability of 
Brady to the Congressional testimony; instead, finding that the failure to 
produce the transcripts was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 
States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
181 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(2). See also Giuffra, supra note 39, at *4; cf. 
Senators Join Coverup, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1996, at A12 (“A two-thirds vote 
of the Whitewater Committee is needed to grant use immunity . . . .”). 
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6005 requires that the Attorney General be given notice of the 
immunity at least ten days before a court order is sought and that 
the district court issuing the order to testify wait an additional 
twenty days from the date of request for an order before issuing 
it.182 The notice period was intended to give the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) an opportunity to (1) convince the investigating 
congressional committee not to grant immunity if DOJ objected to 
immunity, and (2) insulate DOJ’s evidence from any adverse 
affects of an immunity grant.183 Significantly, however, Congress 
is not bound by DOJ objections to grants of immunity.184 
Once the (sub)committee chairperson communicates the 
court’s order to testify to the witness, that person may no longer 
invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.185 However, “no testimony or other information 
compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly 
derived from such testimony or other information may be used 
                                                          
Additionally, the House or Senate may approve a grant of immunity by a 
majority vote. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1). Use immunity differs significantly from 
transactional immunity. See infra note 187. 
182 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(3), (c). The Department of Justice may waive the 
10-day notice requirement. In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(The requirement was “plainly intended to benefit solely the Department of 
Justice.”). 
183 Matter of the Application, 655 F.2d at 1236. See also Application of 
U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 
1270, 1277 (D.D.C. 1973). 
184 Application of the U.S. Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1276. See 
Jill Abramson, Huang Offers To Testify Before Senate If Granted Immunity On 
Fund Charges, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at A3 (asserting that “the Senate isn’t 
bound by the Justice Department’s recommendations on immunity . . . .”). 
185 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Even though the district court will have already 
issued its order to testify, the order is not effective until the witness has 
indicated a refusal to testify and the order is communicated to the witness by the 
investigating Congressional committee. Matter of Application, 655 F.2d at 1237 
& n.21. See NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at 356 (“To put [use immunity] 
into effect, I had to begin by publicly and formally claiming my constitutional 
protections against self-incrimination. Senator Inouye, chairman of the Senate 
select committee, then spelled out the terms . . . .”). 
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against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for 
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply 
with the order.”186 This type of immunity is commonly referred to 
as “testimonial” or “use” immunity.187 
Reviewing the federal immunity statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
6005, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States,188 held that 
the use immunity granted by the statute was “coextensive with the 
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination”189 and prohibited 
“the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony 
in any respect . . . .”190 Further, the Court “impose[d] on the 
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it 
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly 
independent of the compelled testimony.”191 The interpretation of 
Kastigar’s requirements by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia proved an insurmountable burden for the 
government in the prosecutions following the Iran-Contra scandal. 
                                                          
186 18 U.S.C. § 6002. For purposes of this statute, “‘other information’ 
includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material.” 18 
U.S.C. § 6001(2). 
187 Ronald F. Wright, Congressional Use of Immunity Grants After Iran-
Contra, 80 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415 (1995) (Use immunity “promises only that 
the government will not use the compelled testimony directly as evidence, and 
will not use it indirectly as an investigative lead to obtain evidence for a criminal 
case.”). See also Matter of the Application, 655 F.2d at 1234 n.7 (“Rather than 
barring a subsequent related prosecution [use immunity] acts only to suppress, in 
any such prosecution, the witness’s testimony and evidence derived directly or 
indirectly from that testimony.”). In contrast, transactional immunity “precludes 
prosecution for any transaction or affair about which a witness testifies.” Id. 
Accord MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a) and Discussion. 
188 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
189 Id. at 453 (rejecting the argument that transactional immunity was 
necessary to compel testimony). 
190 Id. Examples of prohibited use include “the use of compelled testimony 
as an ‘investigatory lead’” and “the use of any evidence obtained by focusing 
investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.” Id. at 460. 
191 Id. The Court characterized this duty of proof as a “heavy burden.” Id. at 
461. 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
  HARM TO MILITARY PROSECUTIONS 315 
 
B. Iran-Contra 
During the Reagan Administration, anti-tank missiles were sold 
to Iran as part of an effort to secure the freedom of American 
hostages held in Lebanon. However, some of the money from the 
sale of the missiles was then used to support the Nicaraguan 
Contra movement, in contravention of legal restrictions on 
prohibiting such support.192 The resulting scandal, known as Iran-
Contra, directly involved at least two active duty officers, Vice 
Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, 
and two retired officers, Major General (Ret.) Ricard V. Secord 
and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Robert C. McFarlane.193 
Placing a premium on public disclosure to the disadvantage of 
parallel prosecutorial efforts, the congressional committee 
investigating Iran-Contra granted immunity to twenty-one 
witnesses,194 including Poindexter and North.195 Use immunity was 
granted to Poindexter and North over the objections of the 
Independent Counsel.196 The committee opted to grant immunity 
because the Independent Counsel could not guarantee (1) 
indictments before the committee’s term ended, (2) “that the 
American people would ever hear from the two individuals who 
knew most about what role President Reagan had played in the 
                                                          
192 WILLIAM S. COHEN & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL, A CANDID 
INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS 1, 11 (1988). 
193 All Naval Academy graduates, North was an active duty Marine 
Lieutenant Colonel and Poindexter was on duty as a Vice Admiral; McFarlane 
had retired from the Marine Corps after twenty years of service. Id. at xv, 81. A 
West Point graduate, Secord had retired as an Air Force Major General. Id. at 
xvi, 68. 
194 Id. at 39. 
195 Id. at 41. Secord did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination and elected to testify without a grant of immunity. Id. at 65. 
Similarly, McFarlane “neither sought nor received immunity for his testimony, 
although he was under active investigation by Independent Counsel Walsh.” Id. 
at 88. See also id. at 39-40 (concerned about “bring[ing] the full story to the 
public . . . .”). See RUDMAN, supra note 50, at 150 (“whether or not they went to 
jail was far less important than getting their testimony before the public . . . .”). 
196 COHEN & MITCHELL, supra note 192, at 40-41. 
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Iran weapons sale and Contra-aid programs,” and (3) that a trial 
would even occur.197 However, recognizing the “heavy burden” 
that a grant of immunity would place on the Independent Counsel’s 
prosecutorial efforts, the committee agreed to delay seeking 
immunized testimony in order to permit the Independent Counsel 
to gather and insulate his evidence, protecting it from the taint of 
the immunized testimony.198 Ultimately, the grant of immunity 
proved catastrophic for the Independent Counsel’s prosecution 
efforts. 
Both North’s and Poindexter’s convictions were overturned, 
not because of the improper exposure of the prosecutors to 
immunized testimony, but because of the exposure of various 
grand jury and trial witnesses to the immunized testimony.199 In 
United States v. North,200 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit viewed the Kastigar opinion as 
requiring a “total ban on use” and explained further that “Kastigar 
is . . . violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness whose 
testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony, 
regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled 
testimony.”201 Prohibited use occurs “if the immunized testimony 
influenced the witness’s decision to testify” “even where the 
witness testifies from personal knowledge . . . .”202 Further, the 
court suggested that improper use occurs when “a witness’s 
testimony ‘was motivated by’” immunized testimony.203 Finally, 
the court made it clear that Kastigar was not satisfied merely by 
                                                          
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 40-42. 
199 Wright, supra note 187, at 425. Indeed, prosecutors avoided exposing 
themselves to the immunized testimony by canceling newspaper subscriptions 
and discontinued watching television. Id. Additionally, prior to the beginning of 
the testimony, prosecutors filed completed witness interviews, and trial 
memoranda of litigation strategy and investigative efforts with the court, and 
took steps to avoid exposing the grand jury to the immunized testimony. Id. 
200 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
201 Id. at 941-42. 
202 Id. at 942. 
203 Id. In this case, “North’s immunized testimony motivated one witness, 
Robert C. McFarlane, to expand upon his testimony.” Id. at 942 n.1. 
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the prosecution “insulating itself from exposure to immunized 
testimony.”204 
Subsequently, in United States v. Poindexter,205 the D.C Circuit 
emphasized that the Supreme Court in Kastigar prohibited any use 
of compelled testimony.206 Further, the court determined that when 
a witness, who has been exposed to immunized testimony, claims 
that he or she cannot “segregate the effects of his exposure,” the 
prosecution does not meet its burden of establishing evidence 
independent of the immunized testimony “merely by pointing to 
other statements of the same witness that were not themselves 
shown to be untainted.”207 Although much of North’s testimony 
was consistent with his congressional testimony, North’s testimony 
at his own trial failed to meet the prosecution’s burden even 
though “North’s testimony related to events he lived through and 
of which he had personal knowledge without any reference to 
Poindexter’s testimony.”208 This standard, the dissent argued, 
permits a witness with a “well-timed case of amnesia” to allege 
that he cannot separate his pre-exposure knowledge from what he 
learned from the immunized testimony, and thus presumptively 
taint his entire testimony.209 
The North and Poindexter decisions create difficult hurdles for 
prosecutors to surmount when there are high-visibility 
congressional hearings involving immunized witnesses. In the 
wake of the North decision, dissenting Chief Judge Wald of the 
Second Circuit opined that the court had “rendered impossible in 
virtually all cases the prosecution of persons whose immunized 
                                                          
204 Id. at 942. 
205 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
206 Id. at 373 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 462 (1972)). 
207 Id. at 376. In the instant case, North alleged that he could not segregate 
his own recollections from his exposure to Poindexter’s immunized testimony 
before the select committee. Id. at 375. The trial judge did not believe North, 
“reject[ing] Colonel North’s statement as ‘totally incredible.’” Id. at 389 
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
208 Id. at 389 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
209 Id. at 390. See Wright, supra note 187, at 427 (“[A] hostile witness 
might intentionally expose himself or herself to the immunized testimony, 
hoping to make later testimony useless to the prosecution.”). 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
318 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
testimony is of such national significance as to be the subject of 
congressional hearings and media coverage.”210 The North and 
Poindexter decisions are particularly significant because, within 
the federal system, “the D.C. Circuit is the appeals court most 
likely to hear challenges to prosecutions in the wake of 
congressional grants of immunity . . . .”211 Accordingly, as a result 
of the North and Poindexter opinions, Congress has been less 
inclined to grant immunity.212 
C. The Effect of Congressional Immunity on the Military 
Justice System 
If a congressional committee were to immunize a military 
witness, the military justice system would necessarily be required 
to honor the associated witness protections.213 Because military 
courts are not bound by decisions of the D.C. Circuit in North and 
Poindexter, the scope of those protections would be determined by 
military, rather than federal law. However, the military justice 
system has generally elected to follow these two precedents. 
The military’s immunity procedures, contained in R.C.M. 704, 
                                                          
210 United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 951-52 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
211 Wright, supra note 187, at 419 (this is because “most of the executive 
branch officials testifying before Congress (at least those witnesses valuable 
enough to merit immunity) will live and work in Washington.”). Id. at 419 n.49. 
212 Giuffra, supra note 39, at *2 (“The decisions of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the convictions of Mr. North and 
Mr. Poindexter have made it less likely that congressional committees will vote 
to grant immunity.”); Wright, supra note 187, at 431 (“Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the North and Poindexter decisions have discouraged 
congressional committees from using immunities in particular cases . . . .”); cf. 
Abramson, supra note 184 (“several senators on the panel [investigating 
campaign finance irregularities] have expressed unease about creating 
impediments to subsequent prosecutions,” noting the effect of immunity grants 
from the Iran-Contra hearings). 
213 See United States v. Allen, 59 M.J. 478, 482 (2004) (“A grant of 
immunity by one jurisdiction within the federal structure, such as a State, 
provides equivalent protections against use of the information by other 
jurisdictions, such as another State or the Federal Government.”). 
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are consistent with the federal practice.214 Compliant with 
Kastigar, military law prohibits the prosecution from using 
compelled testimony against an immunized service member,215 
except for perjury, false swearing, false statements, and the refusal 
to obey an order to testify.216 Significantly, the military follows 
those federal courts that have extended Kastigar’s use prohibition 
to “include non-evidentiary use such as the decision to 
prosecute.”217 Further, following the precedent established by 
North, military case law prohibits the Government from using “the 
testimony of a witness which was influenced by the immunized 
testimony.”218 
As with federal prosecutors, military trial counsel bears the 
“heavy burden” of establishing “non-use of immunized 
testimony.”219 The United States must “show that it has not used in 
any way for the prosecution of that person the person’s statements, 
testimony, or information derived from them.”220 The immunized 
                                                          
214 See United States v. Mapes, 59 M.J. 60, 66 (2003) (noting that the 
military’s immunity procedure is “[c]onsistent with [the] federal practice . . . .”); 
United States v. Olivero, 39 M.J. 246, 250 (C.M.A. 1994) (“R.C.M. 704(b) is 
based on 18 U.S.C. § 6002.”). 
215 Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. 
216 See MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(b)(1) & (2); Mil. R. Evid. 
301(c)(1). See Olivero, 39 M.J. at 250 (perjury). Similarly, in the federal system, 
an immunized witness may still be prosecuted for perjury or making false 
statements before a congressional committee. See Giuffra, supra note 39, at *3. 
In the military, a service member may also be subject to court-martial for the 
failure to obey an order to testify after being immunized. MCM, supra note 41, 
R.C.M. 704(b)(1). 
217 Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. See also Olivero, 39 M.J. at 249; United States v. 
Allen, 59 M.J. 478, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“may not rely upon or use immunized 
testimony in making the decision to prosecute.”). 
218 Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. See also United States v. Youngman, 48 M.J. 123, 
127 (1998). 
219 Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67-68. See also MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a), 
Discussion (“heavy burden”). 
220 MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a), Discussion. See also Allen, 59 
M.J. at 482 (“The burden is upon the Government in such a case to demonstrate 
‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prosecutorial decision was 
untainted by the immunized testimony.’”). 
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witness, and the United States, “should be left ‘in substantially the 
same position as if the witness had claimed [the] privilege [against 
self-incrimination].’”221 
Traditionally, prosecutors have attempted to meet their burden 
by “canning” or recording testimony of important witnesses prior 
to receipt of immunized testimony or other evidence.222 This may 
be difficult when such witnesses have not yet been identified, 
refuse to be interviewed, or invoke their Fifth Amendment rights to 
silence or against self-incrimination.223 The problem is aggravated 
when immunized witnesses participate in media intensive 
investigations or cases, including high-profile congressional 
investigations.224 
Military prosecutors will have a particularly difficult time 
controlling witnesses’ exposure to immunized witnesses appearing 
before congressional investigations that are televised or otherwise 
extensively covered by the media. Assuming that the military 
could, or would, order key military witnesses not to expose 
themselves to television or newspapers, implementation of such an 
order would prove problematic. Exposure could be either 
inadvertent or prove necessary for co-accused to assist themselves 
in preparation of a defense. Further, military commanders could 
not order key civilian witnesses to avoid watching television, read 
the newspapers, or expose themselves to other media forms. 
Finally, the potential for an obstruction of justice charge against 
civilian or military witnesses who deliberately exposed themselves 
to immunized testimony as a means of regulating witness exposure 
is uncertain at best. Such cases are difficult to prove,225 and, for 
civilian witnesses, the military would suffer the additional burden 
                                                          
221 Allen, 59 M.J. at 482. 
222 Wright, supra note 187, at 426. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 427. 
225 “[I]t would be most difficult for a prosecutor to prove that the defendant 
witness exposed himself or herself to the testimony with the purpose of 
obstructing the criminal proceedings. Most witnesses will have many legitimate 
reasons, including the curiosity shared by most citizens, for listening to the 
congressional testimony.” Id. 
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of having to convince the DOJ to prosecute the case. 
IV. THE STATUS OF COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES AFTER COMPELLED 
WAIVER DURING A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 
As discussed in Part I, Congress is not bound by common law 
privileges and may compel both testimony and evidence over 
privilege objections. The legal status of otherwise privileged 
material in subsequent criminal proceedings remains uncertain. 
Recent cigarette product liability cases illustrates this area of legal 
uncertainty. 
The litigation involved several state lawsuits against the 
cigarette industry for recovery of Medicaid costs attributed by the 
states to the effects of cigarette smoking, and a concomitant effort 
seeking federal legislation that would facilitate a nation-wide 
settlement of the litigation.226 While many of these lawsuits were 
progressing, Chairman Bailey of the House Committee on 
Commerce issued subpoenas to the tobacco companies, which 
were complied with after the companies were notified that the 
Committee would overrule any assertion of privilege.227 At least 
one law firm received a letter from Chairman Bailey in which he 
threatened to initiate contempt proceedings if the documents were 
not produced.228 The companies asserted that many of these 
documents sought by Congress were subject to the attorney-client 
privilege and to the protections of the work product doctrine.229 
However, a Minnesota state court had previously determined that 
the same documents were either not privileged, or were subject to 
the crime fraud exception.230 Subsequently, the Committee 
“released the documents to the press and the public via the 
                                                          
226 Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 957378J, 1998 WL 1248003, 
at *1 (Mass. Super. July 30, 1998). 
227 Id. at *1-2. See also Reilly, supra note 54. 
228 Reilly, supra note 54, at 51. 
229 Id. at 50. 
230 Id. at 51 (citing State of Minnesota v. Phillip Morris Inc., 1998 WL 
257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct.)). 
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Internet.”231 The Minnesota case settled and plaintiffs moved for 
disclosure of the documents, which the court permitted.232 
In at least twenty-six cases, plaintiffs sought court 
determinations that the tobacco companies had waived their claim 
to asserting a privilege over these documents.233 Nineteen courts 
found a waiver; seven courts did not.234 Of the nineteen courts 
finding a waiver, ten courts expressly relied on the document 
production in response to the Congressional subpoena, but 
“[s]even courts expressly rejected waiver on this ground . . . .”235 
In Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc.,236 the court determined that the defendants waived 
any privilege by virtue of the Minnesota state court consent decree 
and by producing the documents to Congress.237 With regard to the 
production of documents in response to the congressional 
subpoena, the court posited that “a party must do more than merely 
object to Congress’s ruling. Instead, a party must risk standing in 
contempt of Congress.”238 In the instant case, the court found that 
the defendants “did not exhaust all remedies available for 
maintaining a claim of privilege,” such as meeting with the 
Chairman or other committee members, filing a legal 
memorandum containing the factual and legal basis for their 
privilege assertion, submitting a privilege log, or requesting a 
hearing.239 
In comparison, in International Union of Operating Engineers, 
                                                          
231 Philip Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 1248003, at *2. See Reilly, supra note 54, 
at 50. 
232 Reilly, supra note 54, at 51. Over defendants’ privilege claims, the 
Minnesota appellate system affirmed the trial judge’s disclosure authorization. 
Id. The consent judgment contained a provision permitting “plaintiffs in that 
case [to] ‘seek court approval’ to place privileged documents in a public 
document depository.” Id. 
233 Id. at 55. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 56. 
236 35 F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
237 Id. at 594, 596. 
238 Id. at 595. 
239 Id. 
DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:37 PM 
  HARM TO MILITARY PROSECUTIONS 323 
 
Local No. 132, Health and Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc.,240 
a Magistrate Judge rejected plaintiff’s argument that disclosure to 
Congress pursuant to Chairman Bailey’s subpoena waived 
defendants’ attorney-client privilege over such documents. The 
Magistrate Judge first noted “[a]s an initial matter, the involuntary 
or compelled production of privileged or protected documents does 
not waive otherwise applicable claims of privilege or protection so 
long as the privilege holder objects and takes reasonable steps to 
protect its claims of privilege and protection.”241 Reviewing the 
same facts as did the court in Iron Workers, the Magistrate Judge 
determined that defendants “took the reasonable steps required to 
prevent their compliance from resulting in a waiver.”242 Further, 
defendants were “not required to stand in contempt” to preserve 
the privilege claims.243 
The sparse military case law that exists would appear to allow 
the invocation of common law privileges, and preclude the 
admission of otherwise privileged information at courts-martial, 
when a congressional committee forces disclosure of privileged 
information. As a general rule, a grant of immunity does not 
automatically result in a waiver of common law privileges, 
particularly the attorney-client privilege.244 Further, the compelled 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in one proceeding has been 
held not to effect the ability to invoke the privilege in a subsequent 
proceeding.245 
                                                          
240 No. CIV.A. 3:97-0708, 1999 WL 33659387 (S.D. W. Va. June 28, 
1999) (Hogg, M.J.). 
241 Id. at *5 (citing United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 
1992)); Shields v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989). 
242 Id. at *7. 
243 Id. 
244 United States v. Vanderbilt, 58 M.J. 725 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) 
(citing United States v. Brunious, 49 C.M.R. 102, 104 (N.M.C.M.R. 1974)). See 
also United States v. Fair, 10 C.M.R. 19, 26, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 521, 538 (C.M.A. 
1953) (grant of immunity from prosecution did not preclude soldier from 
invoking attorney-client privilege). 
245 See United States v. Romano, 43 M.J. 523 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), 
rev’d. 46 M.J. 269 (1997); MCM, supra note 41, Mil. R. Evid. 510(b) (“Unless 
testifying voluntarily concerning a privileged matter or communication, an 
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In United States v. Romano, a female airman, who was alleged 
to have fraternized with the accused officer, testified at his court-
martial pursuant to a grant of immunity.246 During cross-
examination, Airman Mucci was asked about a statement she had 
made to her attorney in which she denied dating the accused, 
Lieutenant Romano.247 The statement had been made by Mucci 
while testifying as a government witness during an unrelated 
Article 32 hearing involving a different defendant.248 Following an 
objection by the military prosecutor, the trial judge sustained the 
objection, concluding that Mucci had not voluntarily waived her 
attorney-client privilege during the earlier proceeding because she 
had testified under a grant of immunity and denied defense 
counsel’s request to cross-examine Mucci about the statement.249 
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial judge, positing that 
“compelled testimony resulting from a grant of testimonial 
immunity at an Article 32 [hearing] is not a voluntary waiver.”250 
The appellate court relied on Military Rule of Evidence 510(b), 
which provides in relevant part: “[A]n accused who testifies 
[o]n . . . her own behalf . . . under a grant or promise of immunity 
does not, merely by reason of testifying, waive a privilege to 
which . . . she may be entitled pertaining to the confidential matter 
or communication.”251 
                                                          
accused who testifies in his or her own behalf or a person who testifies under a 
grant or promise of immunity does not, merely by reason of testifying, waive a 
privilege to which he or she may be entitled pertaining to the confidential matter 
or communication.”). 
246 Romano, 43 M.J. at 526. 
247 Id. at 528. 
248 Id. at 525-26. An Article 32 hearing is a pretrial investigation of charges 
against a military accused (defendant). It is loosely analogous to a grand jury 
proceeding. See 10 U.S.C. § 832. Unlike a grand jury, the accused may appear 
with counsel, cross-examine witnesses and present his own evidence. Id. 
249 Romano, 46 M.J. at 272. 
250 Id. at 274. 
251 Id. (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 510(b)). However, the court left unresolved 
the possibility that “[t]he defense’s constitutional right to produce evidence 
under the compulsory process clause may overcome the attorney-client 
privilege.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress enjoys both the right and duty to conduct 
investigations into matters within its legislative sphere. Further, it 
is a key participant in bringing matters of national significance to 
the attention of the American public. When investigating matters 
that involve individual criminal misconduct, however, Congress’s 
rights and responsibilities may adversely impact the Executive 
Branch’s ability to prosecute such misconduct. This impact is most 
keenly felt by the criminal justice system when Congress grants a 
witness use immunity and that witness’s testimony is either 
televised or widely reported by the media. The immunity granted 
to Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North during the 
Iran-Contra investigation stands as a stark reminder of the 
potentially devastating effect immunity grants can have on 
subsequent or parallel prosecution efforts. 
The armed forces are frequently the object of Congressional 
inquiry. Further, as exemplified by the Congressional 
investigations into the My Lai massacre and the Iran-Contra 
scandal, active duty members of the military are occasionally the 
object of Congressional scrutiny. As with its federal counterpart, 
the military justice system is similarly affected by congressional 
investigations and grants of immunity. 
Since Iran-Contra, Congress has exhibited an increased 
reluctance to granting immunity, wisely balancing its investigatory 
desires against the needs of the criminal justice system.252 In the 
future, as long as the Department of Defense shows that it is 
capable of conducting thorough and credible investigations of 
individual misconduct within its ranks—as it did following My Lai 
and Abu Ghraib253—Congress should continue to stay its hand and 
                                                          
252 See Wright, supra note 187 (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
North and Poindexter decisions have discouraged congressional committees 
from using immunities in particular cases . . . .”). 
253 See THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE 
INDEPENDENT PANEL AND THE PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE 
IN IRAQ (ed. Steven Strasser, 2004) (containing Major General George R. Fay’s 
report entitled “Investigation Of The Abu Ghraib Detention Facility And 205th 
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permit the military to investigate and, if appropriate, bring to 
justice those individual service members who have engaged in 
criminal misconduct.254 
                                                          
Military Intelligence Brigade”); Bradley Graham & Thomas E. Ricks, 
Leadership Failure Is Blamed In Abuse, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at A1, A19 
(investigation conducted by Army Major General Antonio Taguba, consisting of 
some 6,000 pages, “drew praise from members of both parties for a thorough 
and objective inquiry into the mistreatment”). See also Josh White & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, Abuse Review Exonerates Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16 
(“Pentagon’s widest-ranging examination of prisoner abuse . . .”). But cf. Josh 
White, Rights Groups Reject Prison Abuse Findings, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
2005, at A20 (Human rights group “assailed the Army’s findings that top 
generals in Iraq should bear no official responsibility for abuse at the Abu 
Ghraib prison . . . .”); Michael Hirsch & John Barry, The Abu Ghraib Scandal 
Cover-up?, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004, at 35 (critics charge “that the current 
probes are still too limited to bring full accountability”); White & Graham, 
supra note 2, at A17 (“Senators expressed dismay . . . that no senior military or 
civilian Pentagon officials have been held accountable for the policy and 
command failures that led to detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”). 
254 In the wake of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal, the Army has 
successfully prosecuted several soldiers for related misconduct. See Graner 
Verdict May Alter Davis Defense, ASBURY PARK PRESS (New Jersey), Jan. 17, 
2005, at A6 (Army jury rejects superior orders defense, convicts Army 
Specialist of five charges and sentences him to ten years in jail); Douglas Jehl, 
G.I. In Abu Ghraib Abuse Is Spared Time In Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at 
A15 (Army Private “pleaded guilty to a single charge of dereliction of 
duty . . .”); Jackie Spinner, MP Gets 8 Years For Iraq Abuse, WASH. POST, Oct. 
22, 2004 (Army Staff Sergeant, “the highest-ranking of eight soldiers charged 
with abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, was sentenced to eight years in 
prison . . . “); Jackie Spinner, Soldier Pleads Guilty To Prisoner Abuse, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at A24 (Army Specialist “pleaded guilty to two charges of 
conspiracy and maltreatment of detainees at the prison”); Sharon Behn, Soldier 
Guilty Of Abuse At Iraq Prison, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1 (Army 
Specialist found guilty of four counts of abuse and sentenced to a year in jail). In 
addition to courts-martial, the Army administratively punished several officers. 
See Josh White, General Demoted, But Cleared In Abuse Probe, WASH. POST, 
May 6, 2005, at A8; Thom Shanker & Dexter Filkins, Army Punishes 7 With 
Reprimands For Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004. Other branches of the 
military have also taken action for misconduct against detainees or prisoners. 
See e.g., A Roll Call of Recent Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A9 
(two Marines convicted of prisoner abuse-related charges at Camp Whitehorse, 
Iraq); SEAL Acquitted in Prisoner’s Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A9 
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(one SEAL acquitted, but another determined to have assaulted a prisoner during 
Captain’s Mast, a nonjudicial proceeding); Swell Chan, Marine Sergeant To 
Face Court-Martial In Abuse, WASH. POST, June 12, 2004, at A18 (two Marines 
convicted and two more pending charges for giving electric shocks to an Iraqi 
prisoner at a temporary detention facility). 
